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Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 18 Jun 2008, 12:17
by admin2
Firewall wrote:Na temelju dosad viđenih dokumenata i dokumentaraca to je više nego očito. "Krajina" je bila samo pijun u stjecanju što veće prednosti pa bi u slučaju da sve krene krivo bila prva žrtvovana. Slijedeća bi u najgorem slučaju bila RS ali do toga nije došlo zbog međunarodne zajednice koja je zaustavila napredovanje HV-a . No nakraju cijela propast Miloševićeve politike na opće iznenađenje nije ustvari došla iz Hrvatske ili BiH nego Kosova.

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 18 Jun 2008, 12:17
by admin2
baclawa wrote:Pošto sam bio počastvovan da mi najbolje godine života pojede Miloševićev nacional-socijalizam, mogu pojasniti i zbog čega je Kosovo bilo presudno po njegov režim. Ali, plašim se da ne udjem u off topic conversation...

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 18 Jun 2008, 12:18
by admin2
Firewall wrote:Slobodno otvori temu.

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 18 Jun 2008, 12:18
by admin2
baclawa wrote:Misliš skroz novi topic? Ma ne vredi Milošević toliko...

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 18 Jun 2008, 12:18
by admin2
Firewall wrote:Onda pičimo dalje sa postojećim temama... :wink:

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 16 Sep 2008, 19:04
by treb
A evo i letaka
Image

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 16 Sep 2008, 19:25
by treb
Nemam ga nažalost, samo ovaj screenshot. Čekam relaya da to iskopa. :)

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 17 Sep 2008, 11:42
by JoZ@
Firewall wrote:Ma bravo majstore... :garde ...iz kojeg je to videa?


pa to ima na komsijama il armagedonu
neznam tocno :a015

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 17 Sep 2008, 12:09
by relay station
bilo je to na htv ona emisija kaj je vodila karuza ala pandan dozvolite da se obratimo
Image
neznam je ovo bio frog ili mornarički styx prerađe na lanseru od dvine

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 17 Sep 2008, 12:38
by relay station
ma ne koje komsije ovo je sa htv bilo o elektronskom izvidjanju prica o letjelicama bojnik JoZ@ ce znat o cem pricam [egyptian]

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 17 Sep 2008, 16:22
by JoZ@
neznam za HTV al onda je na amargedonu
ima arkanov govor i pogledi u zrak
i snimka letjelice kak nosi listice
jebga kad sam posudil DVDe i nikad ih dobil natrag :mad

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 22 Sep 2008, 16:44
by relay station
nesto o sigint izviđanju u i oko bosne
SIGINT AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 1992 - 1995

Dr. Cees Wiebes
University of Amsterdam

C.Wiebes@uva.nl

DRAFT: DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT EXPLICIT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHOR.

On July 6th, 1995 the Bosnian Serb Army led by General Ratko Mladic attacked Srebrenica, a Bosnian enclave in East-Bosnia where Dutch Unprofor troops were stationed. In a few days the enclave was conquered. More than 7000 Muslim males were killed or executed. Much has been written about this event but hardly anything on the role Signals intelligence (Sigint). Today I will try to fill this void. Mind you, I will only deal with Sigint in the battle in eastern Bosnia and not other regions.
The former JNA set great store on Sigint during the Cold War. In the 1980s the equipment was radically modernized to bring it up to western standards. This programme took place under the code name Arios. Between 1989 and 1991 they obtained four electronic warfare systems. Each consisted of 14 vehicles to collect Sigint across a 50-kilometre front. During the Krajina conflict in 1991 the VJ used this system to launch artillery attacks on Croatian targets within one minute of a Croatian radio transmission. But it also had enough supplies of older materiel, which could be lent to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). It consisted largely of French, Japanese, Swedish and Russian systems. Wealthy Serb businessmen purchased the equipment in the USA and then smuggled it into Yugoslavia.
In addition, mobile interception trucks were used, monitoring specific frequencies. During the war the Serbian air force used Sigint aircraft. Like Croatia, Serbia had UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) for Sigint. Some of these were stationed in Bihac. Later some fell into Croatian hands. The Yugoslav Navy had a special Sigint ship initially stationed in Split nut later in Kotor, Montenegro. It was equipped with both Comint and Elint capabilities and was used to monitor UNPROFOR and NATO traffic.
There were various Sigint units with targets in Macedonia, the Adriatic and stations were set up for operations against Bosnia and Croatia. Permanent interception stations were under direct command of the VJ General Staff. These analysed the intercepts of domestic and foreign telephone lines as well as diplomatic traffic, data transmissions and encrypted digital traffic. Western embassies in Belgrade were key targets. UNPROFOR and later SFOR and IFOR were also important targets. The time taken for intercepting, processing and sending the report to the Ministry of Defence ranged from 20 minutes to two hours. Important intercepts like telephone calls between Izetbegovic and policy-makers in Washington and calls made by Karadzic were sent directly to Belgrade via secure landlines.
The telephone traffic between Srebrenica and Sarajevo was also monitored. In 1994 the BSA allegedly intercepted calls between Izetbegovic and the local commander Naser Oric in which the latter announced a military offensive. Oric had permanent contact with the General Staff in Sarajevo and sent them regularly reports. The BSA had a network of permanent intercept stations at diverse locations, based on a detailed plan under the code name of Vatra (Fire). Bosnian Muslim Army sources claim that the BSA also had special helicopters with Sigint capabilities. Some MIG-21s had Sigint equipment on board. Comint turned out to be a crucial source for the BSA. A top secret BSA document from 1993 shows that 70% of all intelligence received by the high command came from Sigint.
The main target in Eastern Bosnia was the traffic of the Bosnian Army (BA). When the conflict erupted, the BSA seized the Stolice tower to the north of Tuzla. This was the axis of all the communication traffic in the region. The BSA cut off all the connections with Eastern Bosnia and later with Croatia, Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The number of phone lines fell from 1080 to only 24. The units responsible for electronic warfare did not have such a difficult job, as the Muslims had no special receivers. Most of them, including those in Srebrenica, used Japanese-made walkie-talkies with a range of between five and 20 kilometres. The BSA could monitor this traffic for it normally operated with the same equipment.
The BSA also intercepted the main transmitter in Srebrenica. It had a range of around 50 kilometres. The BSA was, however, confronted with BA crypto, designed by a team led by Dr Muhidin Lelic. This was based on NATO crypto. US services helped Lelic. But the BSA could read open as well as the encrypted BA traffic before, during and after the attack on Srebrenica. The BSA had broken the encrypted software and did read most of the traffic of the 28th Division in Srebrenica.
As far as the attack on Srebrenica is concerned, the measures taken for the defence of the enclave probably held no secrets for Mladic. Traffic between Dutchbat and BA was constantly and successfully monitored. Those trying to escape to Tuzla after the fall of Srebrenica were therefore an easy prey. The BSA could pinpoint the positions of the various groups by working out cross-bearings on the basis of the intercepts. Sigint provided a clear insight into what was happening.

The Signals Intelligence operations of the BA
Sigint not only played a key role in the attack on Srebrenica in 1995, but already in 1993. However, at that year the attack on Srebrenica faltered. Mladic knew that the Muslims were desperate and ready to surrender. BA soldiers intercepted a message from Mladic to his forces around Srebrenica. Mladic ordered them to ‘move forward’ and take the town. Bosnian Foreign Minister, Haris Silajdzic, showed a journalist BSA intercepts, which indicated that Zepa was to be taken. But in 1993 the Muslims were fortunate and Mladic did not press further after UN intervention.
The limitations of the BA capacities did not make it any less effective. They could intercept BSA communications on HF as well as on walkie-talkies. They achieved this with the assistance of a amateur radio club in Srebrenica. They obtained an extra transmitter-receiver. This equipment, flown into the enclave, was suitable for tracking walkie-talkies. In addition, sometimes BSA radio equipment was captured. BA sources admitted to me that they were not able to decipher BSA crypto. In 1993 and 1994 the Comint network was extended; new equipment was smuggled in, especially in 1994. In 1995 additional portable radio equipment, including a short-wave radio, a short-wave antenna and telephone cables were delivered.
Sigint experts often dub the conflict in Eastern Bosnia ‘the Motorola War’. Everyone used walkie-talkies in the mountainous terrain because they were ideal for short-range military-tactical communications. The BA also used special interception stations like Okresanica and Konjuh. Their Sigint was good because the BSA did not bother to encrypt its messages at first. The BA discovered that the higher the rank of the commander, the more open was the communication. The BSA was scarcely aware of communications security, even though it always knew that the BA could intercept their traffic. Apparently, a risk they were willing to take. The BSA had already pinpointed in 1992 the location of nine well-equipped and manned BA interception stations. An officer of the Drina Corps testified to the Tribunal that the communications security was not properly observed. Consequently, the BA collected intelligence on BSA units, location of radio's, planned operations, supply of fresh troops, order of battle, losses, operational plans and logistical problems.
Later, it became increasingly difficult to monitor this traffic as the Bosnian Serbs were more frequently using better crypto equipment. In addition, sometimes discussions took place in Romanian or Hungarian. However, the BA could still follow the traffic at brigade level and lower. Sometimes the intercepts from senior BSA officers showed complaints about logistical and other problems. At that time, the BA still had only limited technical capabilities, a personnel shortage and no mobile interception trucks. It was also plagued by a shortage of spare parts and fuel to keep the electricity generators running at the Sigint stations. The stations at Konjuh and Okresanica targeted the traffic of the BSA. Various witnesses testified in The Hague that this traffic was followed before, during and after the fall of Srebrenica. Konjuh focused primarily on the Drina Corps and the General Staff of the BSA.
As far as their technological capabilities, the BA only had old scanners at the start of the conflict. These could only be used for monitoring tactical intelligence at battalion level. Strategic and operational intelligence was not obtained. Comint was analysed in Sarajevo. There were no teleprinters or computers for crypto analysis. In the course of the war Konjuh, Okresanica and Tuzla encountered more and more difficulties as it tried to intercept the messages of the BSA.
Foreign Sigint experts concluded that the interception equipment used in Konjuh, Okresanica and Tuzla conflict was suitable for intercepting the aforementioned messages. In Okresanica a twelve-metre high antenna was found with different types of aerials attached. There was also a parabola antenna with a diameter of 1.5 metres, which was intended for monitoring UHF radio traffic and a YAGI antenna to intercept the VHF frequency. Konjuh was closed after the Dayton Accord. There were still tape recorders in the building in 2000. The former staff in Konjuh said that they had only UHER tape recorders at their disposal during the conflict. Communications were intercepted with a parabola antenna with a diameter of 1.5 metres and two other antennae.
In 1995 Comint capabilities in Srebrenica itself were very limited. Not enough specialists or equipment. In addition Mladic observed a radio silence when he opened his command centre and HQ from which the attack on Srebrenica would be coordinated until 6 July. Though radio silence was not entirely observed, no major preparations could be construed from traffic-analysis. The BA could follow, to some extent, the movement of BSA tanks and troops and arrival of reinforcements. But, it had no insight into the actual BSA intentions. So, there was no real-time intelligence and no one realized that Mladic prepared a major offensive.
During the attack the BSA continued to read the BA traffic and defence plans if sent via walkie-talkies and radio. It held no secrets for the BSA. The Muslims did not have enough personnel, Sigint equipment, crypto analysts, analysis capabilities or even a communication network to get the collected Comint to the right destination efficiently. The monitoring methods were so labour-intensive that many intercepts went ‘missing’. Only snippets were intercepted. These could still, on occasion, have provided vital intelligence, but never the complete picture. There was no centralized Sigint service, but rather independent collection efforts by electronic warfare units assigned to corps and divisions. This explains the disorganized nature of the Sigint effort by the BA, which was crude and created from nothing. This explains why they used a hodgepodge of commercially available and military radio equipment. There were no computers to assist in decryption work, which meant that they were dependent on plain-language voice intercepts. The BA was always a step behind the BSA in its intelligence operations. In addition, the BA could not count on the US or other intelligence support for the delivery of Comint. Their Sigint coverage of Eastern Bosnia was just too poor.

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 22 Sep 2008, 16:58
by LupusREBEL
Prevedi, brate mili, ja niš ne kužim!

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 22 Sep 2008, 22:12
by relay station
nisa bas tak dobar za prave prevode to cemo znalcima prepustit al bi se osvrnuo na ovo:
The former JNA set great store on Sigint during the Cold War. In the 1980s the equipment was radically modernized to bring it up to western standards. This programme took place under the code name Arios. Between 1989 and 1991 they obtained four electronic warfare systems. Each consisted of 14 vehicles to collect Sigint across a 50-kilometre front. During the Krajina conflict in 1991 the VJ used this system to launch artillery attacks on Croatian targets within one minute of a Croatian radio transmission
znaci:ex jna je ima sta reci u pogledu sigint vrste elektroničkog izviđanja tijekom hladnog rata.u 80etima oprema je radikalno poboljšana i dovedna na zapadni standard.program modernizacije i opremanja imao je kodni naziv ARIOS.znaci između 89-91god ex jna je pribavila 4 komleta za elektronicko ratovanje.svaki komlet sadrzi 14 vozila koji sakupljaju sigint podatke uzduž fronte od 50km.tijekom"krajina"konlikta(tako oni kazu u tekstu da se zvao taj sukob)91e vj je upotrebila taj sistem za napad na hrvatske snage unutar minute od hr radio transmisije..to bi bio moj slobodni prijevod tog dijela

Re: Operacija Oluja 1995-Elektronsko djelovanje HV-a

PostPosted: 23 Sep 2008, 08:22
by LupusREBEL
Ma mogli su se je...
Zato smo koristili ukv radio stanic koje nisu radile u duplexu i k'tome imale su manji domet...
Nerazumjem tu ex JNA i tkzv VSK, naime za vrijeme SFRJ savez radio amatera morao je prijaviti sve radio uređaje tako i CB ejke, da su one u ratu nakraju ključnu ulogu odigrale, a većina manjih telekomunikacijskih uređaja je u ex JNA vršene pomoću tih frekvencija a nisu bili spremni ih ometat...
Pokraj sve te tehnike, ometali su nas evetualno '92 jer ni mi nismo bili spremni na neke radio šutnje i šifrovnik nam je toliko bio jadan da bi debili kužili o čem pričamo...